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RELIGION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL JUDGMENTS
Kent Greenawalt*

This Article addresses the extent to which officials and citizens
should rely directly on their religious convictions to reach political judgments and make political arguments. Reviewing
opposing "exclusive" and "inclusive"positions, this Article suggests that officials generally should not articulatearguments in
religious terms. Many officials should have a greaterfreedom
to rely on religious bases of judgments, and private citizens
should not regard themselves as constrained in the manner of
officials. This approach,defended initiallyfrom the perspective
of detached politicalphilosophy, fits comfortably with a variety
of overarching religious views. The constraints it suggests
should be regardedas a matter ofprinciple, not merely counsels
of prudence. Finally, this Article defends, with qualifications,
the idea that members of the clergy who intend to remain active
in that role should not run for importantpoliticaloffices.

INTRODUCTION

Four decades ago, John Kennedy told a group of Southern ministers that he would not let his Roman Catholicism interfere with
the performance of his duties as President. Some observers believed
that his election, despite substantial anti-Catholic prejudice,
marked the end of religion as a potent factor in American political
life. What a mistake that was.
During the civil rights movement, church leaders helped to
arouse the conscience of the country and religious individuals put
their bodies on the line. Religious groups played a major role in opposition to the Vietnam War, and they have also led the fight
against a liberal abortion law. Ronald Reagan in 1980 actively
courted leaders who were conservative theologically and politically;
the Religious Right became a crucial segment of the Republican
Party, a continuing reality that both assists and harms Republicans
in elections.
In 1976, Jimmy Carter's declaration that he was a born-again
Christian complemented his fundamental message that he would
* University Professor, Columbia University School of Law.
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restore honesty in government. Of the four leading presidential
candidates in the 2000 primaries, only Bill Bradley did not declare
himself to be a devout Christian. Bush said he was born again and
that Jesus was his favorite philosopher.1 Albert Gore said he often
approaches problems with the question "What would Jesus do?"2 Joseph Lieberman strongly emphasized the relevance of faith for political life, a surprising twist in a country in which Jewish leaders
have typically urged a strong separation of church and state.2
In the 2000 Presidential primaries, religion figured in more
complicated ways. In a dizzying series of events, George W. Bush
visited Bob Jones University after his loss in New Hampshire.4 This
university had forbidden interracial dating and had referred to the
Catholic Church as "satanic."' Bush won South Carolina handily."
John McCain sharply criticized Bush's visit and he called the two
most prominent leaders of the Religious Right, Pat Robertson and
Jerry Falwell, "agents of intolerance."7 A day later he referred to
them as "evil," though he later explained this was just a joke.8
McCain supporters telephoned Catholics in Michigan, the site of an
upcoming primary, and connected Bush to the anti-Catholic positions of Bob Jones. McCain won Michigan, but he was then attacked
for playing to religious fears and for unfairly painting Bush as intol9 He was crushed by Bush in the primaries of Super
erant.
Tues10
day.
At least two significant issues in the 2000 election connected
closely to religion. One was abortion. Bush was the leader of a "prolife" party trying to draw votes from a broad spectrum; Gore
stressed the theme that he is "pro-choice." The second issue was
vouchers. Bush favored them and Gore opposed them. At one level,
the question about vouchers is whether aiding private education will
create new opportunities for children in woeful public schools and

1. Hanna Rosin, Bush's 'Christ Moment' Is Put to Political Test by Christians;Act of Faith or PartisanPloy, It Draws Faithful'sAttention, WASH. POST,
Dec. 16, 1999, at A14.
2. Richard Pfrez-Pefia, Lieberman Seeks GreaterRole for Religion in Pub.
lic Life, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 28, 2000, at A14.
3. See id.
4. Deborah Orin, Bush Defends Bob Jones College Visit, N.Y. POST, Feb.
14, 2000, at 20.
5. Id.
6. Richard L. Berke, Bush Halts McCain in South Carolinaby Drawing a
Huge Republican Vote, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 20, 2000, at Al.
7. Cal Thomas, Unholy War in the GOP, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2000, at
Bi.
8. Wesley Pruden, When a Phony War Explodes in the Pews, WASH. TIMES,
Mar. 3, 2000, at A4.
9. Nicholas D. Kristof, Bush Sticks to the Middle to Blunt McCain's At.
tacks, N.Y. TnIEs, Feb. 29, 2000, at A16.
10. Richard L. Berke, Gore and Bush Triumph Nationwide, PuttingNominations in Their Grasp, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 8, 2000, at Al.

20011

RELIGION & POLITICAL JUDGMENTS

403

will spur reform of those schools, or, rather, will draw funds and
able children from public schools, leaving them worse than they now
are. Lying not far beneath the surface is the question of parochial
education. The vast majority of private schools are religious. The
vast majority of these are Roman Catholic and Protestant evangelical. Any broad voucher program in which only secular private
schools benefit is unthinkable. Most opponents of vouchers are
deeply troubled by a breach in the division of church and state."
This Article's subject relates to these questions but is more general. What is the appropriate place of religion in American politics?
The involvement of Pat Robertson, Jerry Falwell, and others in Republican politics suggests the following answer. A true religious
understanding yields various positions on political issues. Those
possessing this insight should draw the appropriate conclusions and
support political candidates and parties who reach the same conclusions. Many political liberals respond that this view improperly
mixes religion and politics, but most liberals did not object when liberal religious leaders struggled for civil rights and publicly opposed
the Vietnam War. Can anything nonpartisan be said on this subject? Most of the participants in this symposium have been engaged
in that effort, and my comment is devoted to it.
My Article has two distinct parts. The first part provides a brief
summary and defense of positions I have developed over the last
decade and a half.2 The second part addresses three separate questions that I think warrant further development: the relevance of"detached" political philosophy about this subject for persons whose
overarching perspective on life is religious; the line between principle and prudence; and the appropriateness of religious leaders occupying political office.
In the first part of the Article, I provide few citations to opposing positions, and I do not attempt to explicate important nuances of
difference among them. I have undertaken that effort in other
works 13 that reveal just how great is my debt to those of varying persuasions who have written thoughtfully on this topic. Here, I summarize the major opposing positions mainly to set the context for my
own. Readers will find rich statements of those positions in the
other symposium essays. I should say at the outset, as I will explain
in more detail below, that one's choice among various positions
comes down mainly to delicate judgments of fact and value, not to
I See Diana Jean Schemo, Focus on Tax Break as Support Wanes on
School Vouchers, N.Y. TIES, Feb. 1, 2001, at Al (describing NEA and National

PTA opposition to school vouchers on the basis of separation of church and
state).
12. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC
REASONS (1995); KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL

CHOICE (1988).
13. See, e.g., PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS, supra note 12;
RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE, supra note 12.
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logical implications of liberal democracy, freedom of religion, or
separation of church and state.

I.
A.

A SUMMARY DEFENSE OF AN INTERMEDIATE APPROACH TO THE
PLACE OF RELIGIOUS JUDGMENTS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL LIFE

The Basic Issue
My general subject is whether citizens and officials should bring
their religious understandings, and other similar comprehensive
views, to bear in debating and resolving political problems. The
practical significance of this normative question is readily apparent
when one thinks of some recent issues before Congress. Should it
adopt legislation to forestall the advent of human cloning? Should it
reduce the capital gains tax? Should it propose a constitutional
amendment about abortion? Should it expand medical insurance?
Should it provide the death penalty for serious federal crimes?
Should it accept or reject same-sex marriage (so far as it can influence that)? Should it assist people now being cut from welfare rolls?
Many citizens believe that their religious perspectives speak to
these issues. This is strikingly true about abortion and same-sex
marriage, and religious adherents take both sides of the capital
punishment debate. As for welfare and capital gains, religions influence people's sense of what the community owes its less fortunate
members. Someone might say, for example: "The Bible, especially
the parable of the Good Samaritan, teaches us God's wish that we
love our neighbors; we must fulfill that obligation by giving greater
aid to the poor."
Should such religious grounds figure in public debate or be kept
out of the political forum? A similar question can be put about nonreligious comprehensive views about human life such as "greatest
happiness utilitarianism;" and whatever one concludes about religious grounds probably should apply to comprehensive views that are
not religious in the ordinary sense. I shall concentrate on the more
stark, more controversial question about religion.
My own answer to the question of the place of religious grounds
is an intermediate one, which I should like to think is nuanced in
terms of our culture and history and is realistic about human capacities.
I am assuming for my discussion that the law provides for the
free exercise of religion and for substantial separation of church and
state. I do not mean to imply by my consideration of religious
grounds in politics that those broad issues matter as much for religious liberty and respect among citizens as the constitutional principles that govern the state and religion, only that the issues are
important enough to warrant our serious reflection.
This Article is not about the appropriateness of interest group
politics. I do not consider the extent to which people may (ethically)
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support policies simply because those policies will benefit them. I do
not consider whether officials may (ethically) support policies simply
because they will benefit some constituents. Insofar as legislators
adopt a law because it will benefit a particular religious group, the
crucial question arises whether that is a permissible accommodation
of religion or a forbidden promotion of religion. The Establishment
Clause sets limits on interest group politics as practiced by religious
organizations and by representatives who cater to them. But that
topic differs from my focus here, which is about claims, resting on
religious grounds, that justice (e.g., to a fetus) or overall social benefit requires a law or policy.
This Article is also not about identity politics-whether candidates for office appropriately appeal to voters on the basis of their
ethnic origin, gender, race, or religion. No doubt, conclusions about
using religious grounds in politics bear on the extent to which candidates should appeal to voters on the basis of their own religious
identity, but I do not pursue those implications. In sum, my treatment here is much less than a comprehensive review of religious
bases of political judgment and electoral appeal in American politics.
A look at more extreme positions about how using religious
grounds in politics sharpens the crucial questions by showing what
is genuinely debatable and what is not. This exercise is vital since it
is easy to slip into confusion. After this summary and clearing
away, I present my own position and some observations about political theory.
B.

The Exclusive Position
People who challenge the injection of religion in politics adopt
what we may call an "exclusive" position. They claim that political
decisions in democracies should be made on grounds that are shared
premises of that form of government and on forms of justification
and ways of determining facts that are accessible to all citizens.
Whatever the exact mix of the rational, nonrational, and irrational is in religious understandings, no religious perspective is
shared by all citizens, no perspective rests on methods of justification and determining facts that are accessible in the required way.
Religious belief depends partly on faith, personal experience, and
distinctive tradition; adherents of one religion cannot present "logical" arguments that alone will persuade outsiders to their views.
Religious belief and practice is fine for individuals and communities
of faith, and religious perspectives may enrich our cultural understandings. But when citizens are coerced, the state acts unfairly
unless it has reasons that have force for all citizens. Religious reasons do not qualify. They do not belong in democratic politics. This
is a matter of fairness, and also of political stability. Neither citizens nor officials should present religious reasons in public debate;
neither group should rely on such reasons to determine their politi-
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cal positions.' 4 Bruce Ackerman has expressed the exclusive position piquantly. Decisions about abortion should not be based on a
"conversation with the spirit world."'5
Some brief clarifications help to define this "exclusive" position.
First, it concerns politics, not broader public culture. It does not
rest on a claim that religion belongs in a private, wholly nonpublic
sphere. Second, the position does not rely on a naive view that people will be wholly uninfluenced by religious understandings. The
idea is that people should discuss political issues in public without
reliance on religious premises and they should try to make up their
minds accordingly. Third, the position does not depend on religion
being foolish superstition. Of course, everyone should avoid arguments based on superstition, but if that were the basis for excluding
religion, we would need persuasive reasons to conclude that religion
is foolish superstition. Whatever some proponents of exclusion may
think about religion, they ground their position on premises of
democratic government, not on the foolishness of religion. Further,
more than ninety percent of our citizens identify themselves as religious.' 6 They cannot be expected to avoid religion in politics because religion is foolish. Finally, we have to be careful about what
the "exclusive" position entails. What it urges is "self-exclusion."
No one proposes punishing or silencing those who make religious
arguments. 7 The proposal is that people should refrain from making religious arguments because these arguments do not fit with
how liberal democracies should work.
C.

The Inclusive Position
The "inclusive" position is that citizens and officials should be
able to rely on whatever sources of understanding seem to them
most reliable and illuminating. If a respected religious authority
like the Pope, or a divinely inspired text, or one's personal sense of
how God relates to human beings, suggests that we should help
those who are less fortunate, why should that not count for our position on welfare reform and medical insurance? People do not feel
whole if they try to divorce their deepest sources of insight from
their political stances. Moreover, shared premises and methods of
justification are too thin to resolve many political issues; they leave
too much unsettled in a society as diverse and divided as our own.
Fairness consists not in self-exclusion, but in everybody relying on
14. I should note that Robert Audi, a major representative of an exclusive
position who is participating in this Symposium, has consistently taken the position that people must have adequate secular grounds, but that they may advance supplementary religious grounds.
15.

BRUCE A. AcKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 127 (1980).

16. Richard John Neuhaus, A New Order of Religious Freedom, 60 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 620, 629 (1992).
17. Indeed, guarantees of free speech and free exercise protect such arguments.
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what they think is most convincing. A full airing of all those views
will enrich everyone's understanding. A healthy democracy will not
be unstable because religious arguments figure in political discourse.
This inclusive position requires only one clarification. An advocate need not claim that every ground for a political position is appropriate. Some grounds may be contrary to premises of liberal democracy. Racism and other denials of equal worth fall into this
category. But religion has never been so regarded in our country.
From the beginning, people have thought religious belief and practice are fully compatible with the underpinnings of our political order.
In the course of presenting two straightforward competing positions, I have indicated five matters that are not at issue, but are
sometimes confused with what is genuinely debatable. What is not
at issue is: (1) whether some justifications do not belong in liberal
politics because they conflict with basic premises of our form of government; (2) whether religion is foolish superstition; (3) whether religious belief and practice should be relegated to a private realm; (4)
whether people will be influenced in politics to some degree by religious understandings; and (5) whether people should be forbidden
to express political positions they base on religious premises.
D.

"Detached"PoliticalPhilosophy
I now introduce two other clarifications. The first concerns the
manner in which one analyzes the problem of religion and politics.
Should one start with a particular comprehensive view, say Roman
Catholicism, Orthodox Judaism, liberal Protestantism, or Kantianism, and see what implications follow for politics, or should one do
"detached" political philosophy, not relying on any particular comprehensive view? Both exercises are valuable. What I am doing
initially is the latter, "detached" political philosophy. One hope is
that this analysis will appeal to those who hold different comprehensive views, and in the second part of this Article I say something
about various religious positions and their implications.

E.

Impositions
My second clarification concerns the difference between what
legislation does and the reasons why it is adopted. Some laws are
bad because they impose unacceptably on others, whatever their
underlying reasons. A law that forbids all religious practice except
that according to Islam or Catholicism is an unacceptable imposition
of religion even if the underlying reason for its adoption is political
unity rather than religious truth. I believe, more controversially,
that the same is true about class prayer in public schools; its wrongness does not depend on the reasons people may have for supporting
it. Partly because some prominent proponents of the inclusive posi-
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tion also support measures that impose,' 8 opponents may suppose
that if religious impositions are bad, religious grounds must also be
bad. But this is a fallacy. Many pieces of legislation do not impose
religious views in this manner, but might be based on religious
grounds. Two examples are abolition of capital punishment and increased assistance to the poor.' 9 It is also possible that a law that
would not otherwise impose might impose to a degree if the legislature announces that it was guided by a controversial religious
premise. Such an announcement might amount to an endorsement
of a religious perspective that "puts down" those of different views.
Adoption of those measures would not impose religious views and
practices on anyone.
I do not claim we can always easily say whether a law imposes
in the way I have suggested. Laws against same-sex marriages, for
example, are difficult to classify. All I claim is that religious
grounds might figure in the adoption of many laws which do not impose. Those are the instances that mainly concern me.
F.

IntermediatePositions
The attractions of each of the two basic positions about using
religious grounds constitute a powerful obstacle to wholesale acceptance of its competitor. A closer examination of what is at stake
may lead us to doubt that one set of answers is right for all liberal
democracies, and it may make us recognize that the strength of the
arguments for the two positions varies with different groups of people and aspects of participation in political life. From these insights
come the seeds of a more nuanced, defensible, not wholly satisfactory, intermediate position for the United States at the beginning of
the twenty-first century.
Before I sketch my own position, I want to mention two other
kinds of intermediate positions. One is that everything depends on
the quality of a religious understanding."0 Views that are not dogmatic and sectarian, that are open to competing points of view, play
a useful role in politics. Views that are narrow and dogmatic, that
leave nothing for dialogue, do not belong in the politics of a liberal
democracy.
18. One thinks of the Moral Majority and Christian Coalition. Jerry Falwell, co-founder of the Moral Majority, delineates three areas of political action,
registration, information, and mobilization, in order to fulfill his political objectives. JERRY FALWELL, LISTEN, AMERICA! 261 (1980).

19. Of course, it is possible to argue that any reliance on religious grounds
is a kind of imposition; but that is a different kind of imposition. On the view
that any reliance on religious grounds constitutes an imposition, the same law
might or might not be an imposition depending on the reasons why it was
adopted.
20. See William Kristol, The Heavenly City of Post-ConstitutionalConstitutional Theory, 51 U. Cm. L. REV. 315, 319 (discussing MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE
CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 98-99 (1982)).
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This approach founders on the difficulty that self-exclusion is at
issue. People do not rush to embrace the idea that their own views
are narrow, dogmatic, and inaccessible. Even if they do perceive
their religious views in this way, they are likely to think that asking
them to refrain from relying on religion would be unfair when their
looser, more liberal, perhaps heretical, brothers and sisters may do
SO.
John Rawls has offered a different intermediate position. 2 He
distinguishes ordinary political issues from constitutional issues and
issues of basic justice. For ordinary issues, use of religious grounds
is appropriate; but for constitutional issues and issues of basic justice, people should rely on reasons that would have persuasive force
for all reasonable citizens. This position faces a kind of technical
difficulty. Ordinary issues are deeply intertwined with constitutional issues and issues of basic justice. More fundamentally, the
grounds for such a sharp distinction between the two kinds of issues
are not convincing.
G.

CrucialDistinctions
My own position relies heavily on two distinctions. One is between grounds ofjudgment on the one hand, and advocacy and justification on the other. The second distinction is between officials and
ordinary citizens.
When we reflect on how we make up our minds and discuss issues, we perceive that monitoring our discourse is a lot simpler than
restricting our bases for decision. Moreover, other people who hear
our discourse cannot know our full grounds of decision.
Most people would be hard put to try to carry out a program of
excluding their deepest religious convictions from their political
judgments. They could not disentangle what they believe because of
underlying religious convictions, from what they would believe if
they relied only on premises of liberal democracy and shared techniques of understanding.
Speaking without reference to religious convictions is not difficult. Members of our law faculty share an assumption that they
should resolve school problems in terms of values that are not explicitly connected to particular comprehensive views. I have yet to
hear a specifically Jewish, Christian, atheist, or Benthamite argument for a faculty decision. Yet, I wonder if colleagues try rigorously to remove the threads of their religious and other broad un2L See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLTnCAL LMERALISM (1993); John Rawls, The
Idea of PoliticalReason Revisited, 64 U. Cfa. L. REV. 765, 794-801 (1997). For
an extended comment on Rawls' position, see KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE
CONsCIENcEs AND PUBLIC REASONS, supra note 12, at 120; Kent Greenawalt,
Grounds for Political Judgment: The Status of Personal Experience and the
Autonomy and Generality of Principlesof Restraint, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 647,
666-67 (1993).
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derstandings about the nature of society and education for a profession.
People who refrain from making arguments from explicit religious premises will know if others match their restraint. If someone
tries to purge his silent deliberations of religious influence, he cannot be sure if others are similarly motivated; and realizing how difficult this purging exercise is, he will question the success of those
others, even when the others are trying. Such uncertainties are a
poor foundation for self-restraint that needs to be reciprocal.
Officials differ importantly from ordinary citizens. Making and
applying law is much more the business of officials than of citizens.
The number of officials is small in comparison with the number of
citizens. Officials are used to making judgments and offering reasons that do not include all that is relevant in their personal lives.
Citizens are less used to practicing such restraint. A highly educated, participating citizenry might learn to distinguish between
what matters for most aspects of life and what matters for politics.
But that is not our citizenry. When officials practice restraint about
using religious grounds, that impinges much less on a population's
religious liberty than when citizens do so. Official restraint more
greatly affects the quality of political life.
These basic distinctions-between advocacy and judgment, and
between officials and citizens-suggest that, if any self-exclusion is
justified, it is self-exclusion for officials in their public statements.
That is the core of my position.
H.

Officials
Some officials make law. Others apply law, and most of those
also exercise discretionary judgment. Among officials who apply
law, judges and quasi-judicial officials often provide reasoned justifications for their decisions. In the United States, judges do not provide explicit religious grounding in their opinions, even when they
reach beyond standard legal sources, to comment on the social benefits or harms of possible results. By explicit religious grounding, I
mean reasoning from a religious proposition to a conclusion about
justice or social good.
Judges may examine familiar religious sources to show the
community's attitudes toward a practice or its deep moral assumptions, and judges occasionally employ traditional religious stories to
illustrate a point; but these are not reliance on religious grounds in
the sense that I mean. Although judges rarely candidly state the
strength of competing arguments, they rely on arguments they believe should have force for all judges. In our culture, this excludes
arguments based on particular religious premises.
Matters are more complicated with legislators. If they placed
an explicit religious grounding in a statute's preamble, that might
well constitute a promotion of religion forbidden under the Estab-

2001]

RELIGION & POLITICAL JUDGMENTS

411

lishment Clause. Members of Congress typically do not make religious arguments on the floor of Congress or before their constituents.
There is, however, no accepted understanding that when they develop positions, they should give no weight to their own religious
convictions, or to those of constituents. I believe legislators should
give greater weight to reasons that are generally available than to
reasons they understand are not generally available. But some reliance on religious reasons is appropriate, especially since the generally available reasons are radically indecisive about some crucial social problems. Present conventions about national legislators reflect
a sound accommodation of the needs of a religiously diverse citizenry with the inclination of legislators to bring all they believe to
bear on political problems.
If legislators rely on religious understandings more than their
public advocacy reflects, are they lacking in candor? Does restraint
impoverish discourse and leave voters less well-informed than they
might be? These are genuine concerns, but realism counsels that
much of what legislators say is far from fully candid. Any selfrestraint about religious grounds is hardly a major contributor to
lack of candor. In any event, the value of self-restraint overrides
this drawback and whatever reduction in information voters suffer.
I am not suggesting that legislators should deny religious bases that
motivate them; only that they should develop public arguments in
other terms.
L

Citizens
Because citizens are not used to practicing self-restraint of this
kind, and because most citizens have little involvement in the political process, citizens need not regard themselves as constrained to
avoid relying on religious grounds or to avoid stating those grounds.
Some citizens, however, such as university and corporation presidents, and individuals consistently engaged in political life, have a
much more public role. For them, something like the constraints for
legislators are appropriate.
Religious leaders and organizations have a special place. They
should develop religious grounds as these relate to political problems, and they properly take part in direct efforts to win support for
particular positions. Usually religious leaders endorsing parties or
candidates is unfortunate, and people who become public officials
should not, at the same time, hold themselves out as religious leaders. Thus, I regret the entangling of the leaders of the Religious
Right with the Republican Party. Such alliances risk alienating
those with opposed religious views, polarizing politics on religious
grounds, and making religion too political.
When we examine our political practices, we see that our society
has had some loose, moderately controversial conventions about the
place of religion in political life. I think those conventions represent
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one appropriate approach within a liberal democracy, one that continues to be well suited for our society. I regret that within the
larger society there is a kind of sharp division between serious religion, which affects many people and has a considerable influence
on political life, and the broad popular culture, which has become
largely nonreligious. Were there more dialogue in the national culture about a religious or spiritual dimension of life, that would be
healthy. What I do not favor is a substantially increased injection of
religious premises into discussions of particular political issues.
J.

PoliticalPhilosophy: The General and the Particular
Let me say a few words about the implications of my analysis
for political philosophy. Much of the theorizing about this subject
has been cast in terms of liberal democracies in general, or as what
the Establishment Clause of our Constitution actually requires.
Neither of these approaches answers the most central practical
questions.
The Establishment Clause, in its direct force, has modest implications here. It is mainly about what laws do, not why they are enacted.
What of liberal democracies and theories of legitimacy? Democratic theorists argue persuasively that, in a liberal society, people
will adopt many different comprehensive views. This condition, a
corollary of freedom of thought, will not change. The history of
western liberal democracies, forged out of religious division, shows
that religious differences can produce intense conflict; but we can
imagine people with a spectrum of religious views who seek to learn
from one another and who trust each other's social judgments.
These people might welcome religious perspectives in political discourse. On the other hand, one might not recommend an explicitly
religious politics as the most fruitful approach for a newly constituted Northern Ireland or for a fragile union in Bosnia. Much depends on society's history and culture, on the religious and other
comprehensive views that people hold, and on the degree of mutual
tolerance and respect. If I am right about this, specific principles of
self-restraint must be offered for particular political orders and
times, not in gross. If this is true about religious discourse and
public reason, it is also true about many other practical issues to
which political philosophers speak.
The United States is a country of great diversity in culture and
religion. The percentage of our people that is neither Christian nor
Jewish increases steadily,2 2 with immigration policies that no longer
discriminate egregiously against Asians. Outright religious conflict
22. See, e.g., Largest Religious Groups in the U.S., at http:/www
.adherents.com/rel_USA.html (last updated Jan. 28, 2001) (containing charts
showing that an estimated 74% of the U.S. population identified itself as Christians or Jewish in 2000, down from 84% in 1990).
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is rare, but religious differences remain a source of distrust and tension. Religious convictions are intense and widespread enough to
influence politics and to disturb people with their influence. That is
why some restraint is needed.
In summary, the right components of political and legal discourse may vary among different liberal democracies. At this point
in time in the United States, citizens should regard themselves as
free to connect their religious convictions to political positions.
Judges and similar officials should seek nonreligious bases of judgment and grounds of argument. Legislators should give a kind of
priority to justifications that do not depend on religion in arriving at
positions, but they need not rule out all such justifications that they
or their constituents find persuasive. In public defense of political
positions, they should not use religious justifications.

H.

RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES
Those with deep religious convictions about political life sometimes challenge my whole approach. The strongest form of the
challenge might be summarized like this:
A seriously religious person will be guided by his or her religious perspectives. Any attempt to discuss the problem of religion and politics from the standpoint of 'neutral' political
philosophy may be totally misconceived. At best it comports
with a "wishy-washy" or "watered-down religiosity"; it is irrelevant in the lives of those with strong religious beliefs.
How can I answer this challenge? I acknowledge that for a person with strong religious commitments that embrace the whole of
life, the detached arguments will be persuasive only if they fit with
those commitments. I also acknowledge that the detached arguments will not fit with all religious commitments. Suppose a legislator believes that the Bible is the infallible word of God, that in the
story of Sodom and Gomorrah it authoritatively speaks God's word
that any society that permits homosexual acts will be destroyed. We
could not expect this legislator to approach issues of gay rights
without regard to his religious perspective. Saving the society is
much more important than any claims of detached political philosophy.
But many other religious positions do fit well within the constraints I have suggested. For those who hold such positions, my
aim is not to suggest that they compromise them, but, as Steven
Smith has put it, to adopt "a more reflective, and so ultimately more
faithful, expression of faith."24
23. Steven Smith uses these terms and reports that students regularly
criticize my position in this way in seminars. Steven D. Smith, Augustinian
Liberal,74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1673, 1675 (1999).
24. Id. (emphasis in original).
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I shall mention three perspectives. These are not necessarily
competitive with each other, and they could combine in various
ways. I shall call the perspectives (1) confidence in moral reason, (2)
minimal aspirations for the state, and (3) respect for the autonomy
and value of all participants in society.
A major aspect of the dominant position in Roman Catholic
moral and political theory is that human beings can arrive at moral
truth by the use of reason unaided by revelation. This is not to say
that all moral truths are accessible to all people; some may be discerned only by the wise. Nor is it to say that scripture and the tradition of the Church play no role. They confirm what reason can
discover and can guide us when unaided reason leaves us uncertain
what to do. But, with very narrow exceptions, no moral and political
truth is known only to people with sound religious faith. Thus, political judgment and discourse need not rely on religious premises.
I do not want to make this sound too easy. What of a Roman
Catholic legislator who thinks a practice is wrong on the basis of
unaided reason, but who is much more certain of her position because it fits the traditional teaching of the church? What if the
"natural" arguments against a practice do not actually persuade her
on the merits, but she thinks they are valid because the church says
so? In either event, her final position, with its degree of confidence,
rests partly on the church's teaching. Should she rely on that and
say so? Whatever she may think about her actual reliance on religion, she might accept as reasonable the restraint I have recommended. She might limit the arguments she actually presents for
her broad constituency to those that do not depend on special religious sources of truth.
A somewhat different approach builds on the pessimism, or realism, of St. Augustine. In The City of God, he contrasts a worldly
city with a heavenly one.' Members of the worldly city are moved
by greed, lust for domination, and pride; members of the heavenly
city by love for God.26 The primary task of civil government is to
achieve a degree of earthly security. "[T]he earthly city which does
not live by faith seeks only an earthly peace, and limits the goal of
its peace, of its harmony of authority and obedience among its citizens, to the voluntary and collective attainment of objectives necessary to mortal existence."27 The earthly city "has a finality of its
own; it reaches such happiness by sharing a common good as is possible when there are no goods but the things of time to afford it happiness."' Before the last Judgment, "as mortal life is the same for
all, there ought to be common cause between the two cities in what
25.
Image
26.
27.
28.

ST. AUGUsTINE, THE CITY OF GOD 464 (Gerald G. Walsh et al. trans.,
Book 1958).
Id. at 327, 464-65.
Id. at 464.
Id. at 327.
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concerns our purely human living." In these comments, Augustine
decisively rejects the classical conception that the purpose of the
state is to promote the good life.
How would my recommendations fit the kernel of this Augustinian view, developed by such modern Christian writers as Reinhold Niebuhr? The realm of government is not salvation; it is justice
and general welfare. In dealing with common problems, citizens
should employ a common discourse. It would not follow that religious citizens would never have occasion to refer to religious truth in
reaching political positions; religious perspectives might influence
their view of what secular justice requires to the poor, the infirm,
the newborn, and the yet-to-be-born. But in a culture in which citizens of diverse religious views, the saved and unsaved, must build a
common life, the main discourse of politics might reasonably rest on
grounds that do not depend on sectarian religious truth. Our society's present approach to politics and religion is by no means the
only set of practices that could carry forward Augustine's vision of
earthly government performing essential tasks for citizens of varying religious perspectives and commitment. But it serves that vision
reasonably well.
Finally, I turn to religious ideas of respect for all human beings
based on the relationship of all of us to God. Genuine respect precludes imposition of undesired religious practices, but it may also
bear on the reasons that are employed in political discourse. If you
and I must resolve a problem, my respect for you may call on me to
find reasons that will appeal to you, not to rely on grounds that you
reject. I do not mean only that it is prudent to persuade others with
arguments they can accept. I am suggesting that trying to find
common ground may be a moral requirement."
Where in all of this does detached political philosophy fit? Of
course, that philosophy might appeal to certain people, whereas arguments from religious premises might appeal to others. But there
is a stronger connection, brought out most sharply by the religious
premise of respect. What would seem fair if no one relied on a religious premise may provide us with a basis to decide what respect
for others requires. On this view, the detached approach could help
to fill in the content of practices that respect calls for.
I am not suggesting that everyone who begins with these various religious perspectives will reach just my conclusions. But the
religious perspectives are compatible with the conclusions, and to
some degree, the conclusions may help fill out their content.
29. Id. at 464.

30. Samuel Calhoun argues from his own religious position that my acceptance of people voting on the basis of their religious convictions allows too much
imposition of religion on nonbelievers. Samuel W. Calhoun, Convictions Without Imposition: A Response to Professor Greenawalt, 9 J.L. & RELIGION 289
(1992).
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III. PRINCIPLE VERSUS PRUDENCE
Virtually everyone who has discussed the problem of religion
and politics has agreed that often it is imprudent to make religious
arguments. Such arguments may put others off and undermine
one's objectives. Prudence in discussion often entails that one develop reasons that are likely to persuade those who need to be persuaded. In many political settings, that may mean not making arguments that rest on particular religious premises.
If any
reasonable inclusivist will concede that making religious arguments
often is not prudent, does his position really differ from mine, and if
so how?
I have responded to these questions by claiming that selfrestraint in argument is a matter of principle, not just prudence.
Reflection does not cause me to abandon this position, but it has led
me to think that the issue is more complex than a simple dichotomy
of principle and prudence might suggest. In large part, the difficulty
is that the terms "principle" and "prudence" carry different meanings for different people and, even for the same person, may carry
different meanings in different contexts. A's strong sense of prudence may not differ much from B's weak sense of principle. A brief
examination of various meanings helps reveal the subtleties.
When someone says, "You should do x as a matter of principle,"
he may imply that you should do x in all circumstances, regardless
of what other people do. My position does not make this claim.
First, I do not assert that self-restraint about using religious arguments is appropriate for every society. Second, even for a society in
which it is otherwise appropriate, a moral imperative to exercise
self-restraint depends on reciprocity. People should refrain from
making religious arguments only if many others of different persuasions do so. Third, even when circumstances make self-restraint
appropriate, I do not think the reasons for restraint necessarily
trump all other reasons. Someone might think a particular proposed law would be so abhorrent that wheeling out useful religious
arguments (needed to prevent adoption) would be preferable to
having the law adopted in their absence. Thus, if a proponent of the
view that self-restraint is a matter of prudence, not principle, wants
to claim that the reasons to follow self-restraint are contextual,
overridable, and do not demand unilateral action, I agree.31
Prudence is sometimes contrasted with principle as a counsel
about means to achieve ends. If you want to avoid cavities, it is
prudent to brush your teeth. Were self-restraint about religious arguments only a matter of prudence in this sense, one should make
31. A different challenge that might be made is that any position that is so
dependent on culture, and responsive to competing considerations, is not truly
principled but a kind of pragmatic compromise. I do not here respond directly
to that challenge, but the discussion in this section indicates in what sense I
believe a position can be both responsive to context and principled.
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such arguments whenever that would serve one's political objectives.
Here is the respect in which my position is one about principle. I am
suggesting that officials should not make religious arguments even
when those arguments would have wide enough appeal to further
their immediate political objectives. I am claiming that selfrestraint has independent value.
A final point concerns the place of consequences in the analysis.
A "principle" may be a guide one should follow independent of consequences. Just how consequences figure in my position is complex.
The reasons for self-restraint depend mainly on long-term consequences within society. The reasons are not independent of consequences, as they might be for a theorist who thinks self-restraint
follows from the very concept of liberal democracy. Yet, individuals
should take norms of self-restraint as having a force that does not
depend on a calculation of consequences in a particular instance.
The "principle of self-restraint" should have weight even when one
cannot perceive negative consequences for not restraining oneself.
(My position about this corresponds with my view about deontological norms in general. That is, I think the validity of such norms depends on long-term consequences for human life, but individuals
making decisions should take the norms as having a force that does
not rest on consequential evaluation. Self-restraint about using religious grounds differs from most deontological norms in depending
more on a particular society's history and culture.)
IV. CLERGY PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL LiFE

In discussing the place of religious leaders and organizations in
the political life of the United States, I have suggested that religious
leaders appropriately take political positions and actively campaign
for those positions, but that they should not attach themselves
strongly to one political party or the other. I also have suggested
that persons should generally not remain active members of the
clergy and seek political office, that such a combination of roles in a
single person too closely ties church and state.
In a thorough and careful article, Paul Weithman has challenged that position. 2 He examines, one by one, various reasons
why having clergy run for and occupy political office might be detrimental, and concludes that none of these reasons apply to clergy in
general. Weithman acknowledges that a religious group may itself
have a view of the role of its own clergy that would be incompatible
with holding political office, and indeed he accepts such a view about
Roman Catholic priests; but such a basis for restraint is drawn from
within a religious tradition, not from any premises about liberal
democracy, separation of church and state, or the political culture of
32. Paul J. Weithman, May Clergy Seek Elective Office?, 74 NOTRE DAIE L.
REv. 1737 (1999).
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the United States.3
Weithman makes a strong argument, and I think it is worth
seeing what can still be said on behalf of a principle of restraint
here. The exercise is revealing about the kind of reasons one needs
to support a political principle of this kind.
Drawing from a vaguer formulation of mine, Weithman initially
clarifies the principle of restraint he is examining: "Citizens of mature democracies who hold positions in an ecclesiastical hierarchy or
are active members of the clergy should not hold elective office or
run as candidates for political office." 4 Weithman acknowledges
that I think the principle can be persuasively defended only in respect to particular political cultures and that, even when it is applicable, a cleric may reasonably believe its force is outweighed by
other reasons." Weithman rightly takes me as believing that the
principle does have application for all clerics in the United States at
this time.36 That is the issue that divides us.
Before I summarize Weithman's argument, I should note a special feature of this principle of self-restraint and a troubling aspect
about the principle's application in the United States. The principles I have been discussing are ones of self-restraint, and that is
true about the clergy limit as well. A cleric should hesitate to run
for office if he plans to remain an active cleric. But the principle has
some force for voters as well. If the principle is sound, voters should
have some hesitancy to vote for clerics (planning to continue as fully
active clerics) who offer themselves for election. Of course, voters
also will be exercising self-restraint, but their self-restraint could
underlie a kind of external resistance to such clerics running for office. That is, if voters hesitate to vote for candidates who plan to
remain active clerics, clerics who plan to remain active church leaders may be discouraged from running from office.
The troubling aspect of any principle of clerical restraint concerns the different practices of clerics and politicians among segments of our population. In particular, a significant percentage of
African-American political leaders have been members of the clergy.
Proposing a principle that active clerics not occupy political offices
may seem insensitive to these traditions and unfair to the present
political convictions of many African-Americans.
I believe that the historical explanation for the combination of
religious and political leadership lies substantially in the oppression
that prevented African-Americans from achieving nonreligious positions of leadership. Whether this is correct, my position can accommodate differences among groups with its acknowledgment that
other factors may outweigh the force of the principle against seeking
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1762.
1741.
1738.
1762.
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political office.
Weithman begins his substantive critique with separation of
church and state." Insofar as this concerns institutional separation,
it will not be threatened by clerics holding political office, if the
clerics support separation.
Against the claim that clerics holding office will be divisive,
Weithman answers that divisiveness provides the right sort of
ground for objecting only if those who feel resentment, anger, or distrust have good reasons for their position.3 Looking for possible
reasons, Weithman treats, in turn, the freedom of citizens to decide
fundamental religious matters and the importance of representatives giving adequate political representation.' Again, he concludes
that, at most, only some clerics in political office would pose a
threat; and he notes that prospective officeholders can explain their
views to citizens, who can then judge intelligently whether a combination of clerical and official roles poses any danger.!
Weithman also examines possible arguments against clerical
candidacies based on (1) a notion that people should have equal opportunities to achieve elective office, and that clerics enjoy an unfair
advantage4 I and (2) a concern that voters will not exercise a proper
degree of autonomy.42 I agree with Weithman that a possible principle of equality in seeking office is irrelevant here; such a principle is
so far from being realized now in the United States that a modest
number of clerical candidacies certainly does not deprive anyone of
some equal right to attain office.
The autonomy concern is more complicated. The idea is that
some people will take what clerics say politically as religiously
authoritative and will not exercise the desirable degree of autonomy
in reaching political positions. I shall not try to summarize all of
Weithman's rich discussion, but he analyzes various positions on
what constitutes appropriate autonomy, focusing on both ideal and
nonideal conditions. If the concern is that some voters will take the
political utterances of clerics as reflecting religious authority, that is
a risk only with some clerics. The religious followers of other clerics
will not assume that religious authority extends to political affairs.
Even if some voters accept a cleric's political positions because of his
religious authority, this seems no more a threat for autonomy than
accepting a candidate's position because he is Democrat or Republican. If some ideal condition of autonomy is satisfied only when voters reach conclusions on the basis of their own critical reflections,
that condition is pervasively violated in real life. It is doubtful

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id-

at 1741.
at 1743.
at 1743-45.
at 1746-47.
at 1748-49.
at 1754.
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whether clerical candidacies should be challenged because they exhibit a feature that is otherwise so common. In any event,
Weithman's crucial point is that clerics, as candidates, need not pose
this threat, and they can do a great deal to avoid it by telling voters
to think for themselves. For Weithman, the argument about autonomy, thus, fails to provide a reason against clerics seeking office.
We can summarize four of the concerns Weithman discusses as
institutional separation, divisiveness, representativeness, and
autonomy. I find no fault with the discrete threads of Weithman's
analysis, but still I am uncomfortable with his conclusion. More
specifically, I am hesitant to adopt his treatment of perceptions that
are not grounded in solid independent reasons, and I disagree with
his resistance to generalizations that are moderately overinclusive.
In brief, I think many people perceive a combination of clerical
and official roles as eroding institutional separation. People who
strongly reject a cleric's religious understanding are likely to feel
discontent at having him as their political representative, and they
are likely to doubt that he will adequately represent them. The consequence may be an unfortunate political division along religious
lines. Some people may accept what clerics say politically on religious authority, and others may worry that such acceptance is happening. Although these effects will be greater with some clerics
than others, and can be countered by clerics who strive to do so,
nevertheless, they remain a cause for concern.
I believe both that some objective reasons support concern about
many clerical candidacies and that common misperceptions, even
ones that can be countered, warrant concern, if those misperceptions
lead people to think they are unfairly represented. Thus, I reject
Weithman's premise that divisiveness caused by resentment, anger,
and distrust is irrelevant unless the people with those feelings have
good reasons for them.
Further, I think the occupancy of political offices by active clerics symbolizes a degree of unity of church and state that is unfortunate, even apart from any assumptions about representative fairness and autonomy.
For me, the appropriate level of generality of principle is clerics
in political office. Even if some clerics pose little threat, those who
are thinking about running may be inclined to underestimate the
threat they pose. And clerics with strong religious authority over
their parishioners might reasonably resent being called on to abstain from running for public office while clerics with weak authority do so. The desirable political principle covers clerics in general.
Now, I admit to two serious problems with my own position.
One is that having a very few clerics in office poses little danger. Is
it right to have a general principle when the serious dangers arise
only after a certain threshold is passed? I think so, because there is
no way to decide which clerics should run and which should not.
But my position would become indefensible if our society had
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reached a point at which so few clerics would be interested in running for office that such candidacies could never create a significant
threat.4
My second problem concerns the present stage of American life.
Perhaps most clerics have so little authority that extends to politics
that clerics running for office no longer generate the dangers that
worry me. An erosion of clerical authority has occurred in mainline
churches, but that hardly seems true across the religious spectrum.
Sufficient dangers remain to recommend the principle that clerical
and political offices should not be combined in the same individuals.
Religious leaders properly take political positions, but they should
not connect themselves closely to particular parties and candidates,
and they should not run for office if they intend also to maintain a
position of active religious leadership.
CONCLUSION

I have claimed that various practices of self-restraint should
keep religion from being too closely mixed with political decisions.
These restraints are supported by moral and political principle, not
merely prudence. One can find support for these restraints in detached political philosophy, and its values of fairness and stability.
One can also find support for these restraints in religious premises
that many of our citizens share.

43. Someone might think our society is now at that point, and it warrants
serious discussion just what dangers presently exist.

